In an attempt to accommodate natural language phenomena involving nominalization and self-application, various researchers in formal semantics have proposed abandoning the hierarchical type system which Montague inherited from Russell, in favour of more exible type regimes. We brie y review the main extant proposals, and then develop a new approach, based semantically on Aczel's notion of Frege structure, which implements a version of subsumption polymorphism. Nominalization is achieved by virtue of the fact that the types of predicative and propositional complements are contained in the type of individuals. Russell's paradox is avoided by placing a type-constraint on lambda-abstraction, rather than by restricting comprehension.
Introduction

Overview
Type disciplines have featured prominently in formal approaches to natural language since the work of Montague (e.g., Montague 73] ). Montague avoided the paradoxes of naive set theory by adopting a version of Russell's cumulative hierarchy of types. Despite the successes of Montague's type system for English, it has met with criticism in recent years for being excessively rigid. One line of research, initiated by Partee and Rooth Rooth et al. 82, Partee et al. 83] , has tried to achieve greater exibility, especially in the treatment of quanti ers, by assigning each expression a family of types. Another line of work has moved in the direction of type-free theories of properties, in order to accommodate the di culties raised by nominalization and self-application. In this paper, we will focus our attention on the second of these two endeavours.
Historically, type disciplines for languages have developed in close association with intended models for interpretation. The proposals we shall make can also be construed in this way, inasmuch as they were inspired in part by Aczel's Aczel 80] notion of a Frege structure, which is intended to provide a consistent formulation of Frege's logical notion of set.
The paper falls into four sections. The rst of these presents some background notions, and brie y surveys the natural language data which motivates our formal analysis. Section 2 presents the syntax, types and inference rules for a language L , while Section 3 deals with the models of L . The nal section shows how a fragment of English can be treated within our formal framework.
Hierarchical Types
A system of types provides a classi catory scheme for the domain and range of functors. The type of an expression determines the domain in which that expression receives an interpretation. Thus, in (1) (where we use the notation : to mean that expression has type ), the proper noun Glasgow might be assigned type e, the type of entities, while the predicate fun is assigned type he; pi, which we construe as the type of objects which combine with expresions of type e to yield expressions of type p.
(1)
Glasgow:e is fun:he; pi .
If we make the plausible assumption that the copular verb is here denotes the identity function on predicates, then standard rules of type inference yield the result that (1) is an expression of type p, the type of propositions.
In recent years, the semantic problems of nominalization in linguistically motivated type theories have received increasing attention, particularly as a result of the work of Bealer, Chierchia and Turner Bealer 82, Chierchia 84, Chierchia 85, Chierchia and Turner 88, Turner 87] . To illustrate, notice that we might want to assign di erent types to di erent kinds of syntactic subjects, as shown in the following two examples: (2) a. Running around the lake]:he; pi is fun:hhe; pi; pi b. For us to run around the lake]:p is fun:hp; pi
In (2a), we might expect the gerundive subject phrase to denote a property, hence to be assigned type he; pi. But if (2a) is to be of type p, fun will require a new type, namely hhe; pi; pi. Similarly, if the subject of (2b) denotes a proposition, then the type of the predicate has to be changed to hp; pi. Yet there is no independent linguistic motivation for postulating distinct lexical entries for the di erent funs of each type.
A related problem arises when we consider cases of self-application, illustrated in (3a) and the simpler (though more arti cial) instance (3b). 1 (3) a. Being fun]:he; pi is fun:hhe; pi; pi b. Fun:he; pi is fun:hhe; pi; pi Suppose we postulate a rst-order predicate fun:he; pi, and a second order predicate of predicates fun:hhe; pi; pi. This allows us to deal with (3) ; but what happens if we want to a rm that fun:hhe; pi; pi is fun? We are at the bottom of an in nitely ascending ladder of types: (4) Fun:hhe; pi; pi is fun:hhhe; pi; pi; pi There seem to be broadly three classes of response to these problems of`type in ation': type-lowering, type-freedom, and polymorphism. We brie y consider these in turn.
Type-Lowering
We have just observed the potential di culties which arise if the subject running in (5) is assigned the type he; pi of verb phrases: (5) Running hurts. For then we are apparently forced to assign a correspondingly higher type to runs. The approach proposed by Chierchia (e.g., in Chierchia 84] ) postulates a nominalisation operator \ which maps propositional functions (and propositions) into entities. 2 That is, if run 0 (the semantic translation of run|we 1 Despite appearances, such locutions are not entirely restricted to the discourse of theoreticians; the following sentence was noted in the Times Higher Education Supplement of 28th September 1990, p.17: In fact, the fun of research is more fun than fun.
2 One of the earliest discussions of treating propositional arguments in a Montague framework, namely Thomason Thomason 76] , adopts a similar type-lowering operation. use Montague's prime notation for semantic constants) denotes a propositional function f, then \ run 0 is an expression of type e which denotes an individual correlated to f. We might assume that the morphological operation which relates the gerundive form running to the nite form runs has as its semantic counterpart the introduction of this \ operator. The resulting semantic analysis is illustrated in (6): (6) hurt 0 :he; pi( \ run 0 :e)
Type-Freedom
From a technical point of view, it is not necessary to explicitly map propositional functions into their individual correlates. Instead, we can regard all properties as being a special sort of individual. Following Aczel Aczel 80], Bealer Bealer 82] and others, properties are those rst-order objects which can be applied|using an explicit operation app of predication|to other objects so as to yield a proposition. This rst-order approach is illustrated in (7): (7) app(hurt 0 :e, run 0 :e):p Although we have declared the types of the expressions in (7), they serve little purpose, since none of them are functional in nature.
Polymorphism
We say that a function is polymorphic if it yields appropriate outputs for inputs of a variety of types. There are at least two notions of polymorphism which can be invoked to deal with these problems. The rst, called parametric polymorphism (cf. Cardelli et al. 85] ), obtains polymorphic types by admitting type variables. In Milner's Milner 78] approach, as implemented for the programming language ml, types containing type variables are called generic. Suppose, for example, that v is a type variable, and that we assign to fun the generic type hv; pi. What happens when we try to determine the type of an expression involving self-application like fun(fun)? Assuming that the second occurrence of fun has the most general type (i.e.,hv; pi), the rst occurrence will have to be assigned a more complex type, namely hhv; pi; pi, where the type variable v has itself been instantiated as hv; pi. Although we are required to assign di erent types to functor and argument in such a case, it should be noted that the complexity of a functor's type is no greater than that required by the most general type of its argument; thus we avoid the`in nitely ascending ladder of types' alluded to in our discussion of strictly hierarchical type systems. An approach similar in spirit to ml is adopted by Parsons Parsons 79] , where Montague's framework is modi ed to allow` oating' types which again contain type variables. Although Parsons considers an interesting range of data, he does not explicitly discuss problems of nominalization.
A di erent route avoids type variables by using something which Cardelli et al. 85 
Individuals, properties and functions
Our treatment takes subsumption polymorphism as a starting point|that is, we will develop a notion of type containment, but avoid type variables. In fact, the formal framework that we develop is exible enough to encompass a range of di erent approaches to nominalization, including type-free ones. However, within the space of options, we have made certain theoretical choices which allow us to model certain linguistic generalizations. In this section, therefore, we will consider some of the motivating data.
In order not to prejudge the issues to be decided, we use the term propositional functor to refer to any expression f of English which can combine with an argument a so that the result f(a) is a declarative sentence, i.e., capable of being used to assert a proposition. Thus, a nite verb phrase such as walks is a propositional functor, as is a declarative sentence lacking a direct object, such as John annoys . We assume that propositional functors denote propositional functions, though just what these are supposed to be is left till later. We will use the more neutral term predicative to cover both propositional functors and words or phrases which intuitively express properties but which cannot combine with other expressions to make sentences. Again, we leave till later what the denotation of predicatives is, if not propositional functions.
The rst generalization which we wish to capture is: Claim 1.1 Predicative expressions can appear in the position of noun phrase (NP) arguments to propositional functors. For example, predicatives can occur in subject position of tensed sentences, i.e., a position which is typically occupied by NPs: (8) a. To run will tire Mary. b. Running annoys Mary.
Thus, according to our terminology, (8a) contains two predicatives, to run and will tire Mary; the latter is, in addition, a propositional functor.
It can also be observed that the distribution of predicatives sometimes extends beyond that of NPs. Thus we have: Claim 1.2 Predicative expressions can appear as arguments to propositional functors where NPs are prohibited.
In particular, certain lexical items are subcategorized to require predicative arguments, as opposed to ordinary noun phrases. The examples in (9) contrast with those in (10) Despite these examples, the fact that non nite verbs cannot combine directly with subjects in root clauses still requires explanation. In the present paper, therefore, we shall maintain Claim 1.3 as it stands, while accepting that further analysis of the issues is called for.
The fourth claim can be regarded as a further speci cation of Claim 1.1. Chierchia suggests that it is an empirical generalization which holds for many, if not all, natural languages: Claim 1.4 Tensed predicative expressions cannot occur as arguments of propositional functors.
Thus, ungrammaticality results if we attempt to replace the untensed predicatives in our previous examples by tensed predicatives: (15) a. *Runs annoys Mary b. *John seems annoys Mary/is happy c. *John tries annoys Mary/is happy Let us now consider how these observations might be rendered in a formal framework. The generally accepted interpretation of Claim 1.1 is that propositional functions have individual correlates. As a further terminological step, let us use the term nominal predicatives to refer to expressions which denote such individual correlates. 3 We make the standard assumption that a model determines a universe of individuals. However, this universe contains a greater diversity of objects than is usual in rst order models; for example, it will contain all propositions as a subcollection. Following Aczel 80], F 0 is collection of objects, and F 1 is the collection of unary functions from F 0 to F 0 . Within F 1 , we can identify the subcollection of propositional functions, i.e., functions from F 0 to propositions, and this we call pf. It turns out that F 0 is also`big enough' to contain, for each function from objects to objects, an object that corresponds to that function. We can then implement the idea of individual correlates by letting the collection pf be explicitly mapped, via the operator, onto a subcollection set of the domain of F 0 . That is, each object in set is the individual correlate of a propositional function. (See Lemma 6 for a proof that is bijective.) Claim 1.2 shows that some lexical items select as their arguments nominal predicatives. However, any solution to this is closely tied up with the problem of capturing the di erence in combinatorial potential between tensed and untensed predicatives, as required by Claim 1.3. For on the one hand, we would like to say that a nominal predicative is the sort of thing which potentially combines with an argument; on the other hand, it can only do this under special circumstances, for example under the mediation of tense.
Let us be more concrete. If we assign the type he; pi to nominal predicatives, then it is di cult to avoid the conclusion that such expressions should combine with arguments of type e to yield a result of type p, i.e, a proposition. If on the other hand we follow Chierchia and Turner 88] in assigning them the type nf of nominalized functions, then it becomes hard to express the fact that there can be semantic constraints on the type of the argument which a predicative selects when it becomes`denominalized'. Suppose, for example, that we wanted to de ne a subclass of untensed intransitive verbs which select for propositional subjects; it would be desirable to assign them the type hp; pi (which we could treat as a subtype of he; pi).
A third option, and the one we shall adopt, is to give nominal predicatives the type he; ei. This makes it clear that such expressions do select arguments, possibly of some proper subtype of e. At the same time, it does not claim that such expressions can combine with their arguments to make propositions. Instead, this type remains`agnostic' about the precise nature of the resulting combination; we know that it is an object, but in the absence of further information, can neither a rm nor deny that the result is a proposition. 4 As pointed out by Chierchia and Turner Chierchia and Turner 88] , the observation that propositional functions cannot act directly as arguments appears to be inadequately captured by rst-order theories of properties such as that of Bealer Bealer 82] in which propositions only result by virtue of explicitly applying a property to another object. For example, on such an approach, John walks would be expressed as (16) ( ! ) will be a metatype. Note that we will not need to quantify over propositional functions, nor will we need -expressions whose domain of interpretation is the collection of propositional functions|we can use nominalized properties instead. Hence, variables in our language will never be assigned metatypes. We shall assume that unin ected (or base form) verb phrases denote objects rather than propositional functions; for example, walk will be of type he; ei.
When verb phrases receive tense, they are mapped by a predication operator into propositional functions, with the metatype (e ! p). Thus if non nite walk translates as walk 0 :he; ei, then tensed walks translates as walk 0 :(e ! p).
Putting the various pieces together, we replace (16) with (17), where the propositional functor is applied directly to its argument, rather than by the mediation of app: (17) walk 0 :(e ! p)(john 0 :e)]:p By way of summary, we give the following tabular presentation of our articulation of the data. Note that our earlier notion of`predicative' is now divided into two.
Syntactic Notion
Semantic Notion (Meta-)Type Example propositional functor function from F 0 to propositions (e ! p) walks, is fun nominal predicative subcollection of F 0 he; ei walk, be fun In this section, we have attempted to present and motivate the general structure of our approach, and it will be observed that we have followed Chierchia and Turner 88] closely in favouring a Fregean analysis over a rst order property theory. Nevertheless, our formal framework di ers from that of Chierchia and Turner 88] in many respects; this will become obvious in the following sections, where we give a more systematic presentation of the theory.
2 The Language L
Judgements and Type Containment
In the theory L developed in this paper, we follow Aczel 80] in starting from models of the type-free lambda calculus, on top of which an interpretation for logical connectives has been constructed; we then construct types within the set of objects. In place of the domain f0; 1g of truth values, we have a domain prop of propositions, included in which is the domain truth of true propositions. These collections provide values for the types p and t respectively. As mentioned earlier, there is also a domain F 0 of individuals, with associated type e. This domain turns out to be much richer than one might have expected. Indeed, it contains prop (and hence truth) as subcollections. In Section 3, we shall look in more detail at the intended models; for the time being, however, we present the type structure.
Following The statement`':p is an assertion or judgement meaning that we can infer that ' is of type p. The rule as a whole is a logical implication; given the premiss, we can infer that 9x:' is also of type p.
What we have presented is not quite su cient, however; if ' contains occurrences of the variable x, the inference that it is of type p may in turn depend on the type of x; in other words, the judgement is made under the assumption, or in the context, x: . Using ?; x:
to represent a context ? which contains the relevant assumption, we replace our earlier rule by the following:
?; x: `':p ?`9x: :':p
Let us now present these ideas in a more systematic format. A type statement is a pair, written : , consisting of an expression and a type , read \ has type "; is said to be the subject of the statement. A signature is a nite set of distinct type statements the subjects of which are constants, while a context ? is a nite set of distinct type statements, the subjects of which are variables or sentences. In the latter case, a statement of the form ':t indicates that ' is a sentence of the logic whose truth is being assumed in the course of a proof; that is, we are also using contexts in a sequent calculus style to encode the current set of assumptions required at each line of a proof.
As usual, we can regard signatures and contexts as functions from expressions to types. Thus, dom( ) denotes the set of expressions to which the signature assigns a type, and similarly for contexts. If A is a signature or a context, we write A; : in place of A f : g.
Although the system used here does not use the power of higher-order type theory (e.g., such as dependent types), we have nevertheless found it convenient to take as our framework the theory of expressions developed in the Edinburgh Logical Framework Harper et al. 87] . As pointed out in the preceding section, we distinguish types, whose interpretations are constructed within the domain of objects, from metatypes, which have a disjoint interpretation as collections of functions and functionals. Types and metatypes are both kinds.
We need three further kinds, or classi cations of types: xed point types (fptypes) well-behaved types (wb-types) and non-propositional types. The latter have the characteristic that their leftmost type is e, hence we use le-type for short. All these types are all interpreted within the domain of objects. As we shall see later, there is a sense in which an fp-type is a complex type which does not have any proper subtypes.
We will use and for types, m for metatypes, and ; 1 ; 2 to range over both types and metatypes. We use c for constants (a special instance of which is ?), x; y for variables, ; for arbitrary object language expressions and '; ; for expressions which denote propositions. We use ?`s to mean that s is derivable within context ?, and ?` s to mean that s is derivable from the signature within context ?.`s and` s stand respectively for ;`s and ;` s, where ; is the empty context. Note that the relation between types is the symmetric closure of , the containment relation.
We mentioned earlier that the inference rules by which judgements can be derived are formulated in natural deduction notation. We add glosses to a representative sample of the rules in order to help readers not familiar with this mode of presentation. We mentioned earlier that the type statements in a context have subjects which are variables or sentences. As far as the former is concerned, it can be seen that (: context) requires to be a type, not an arbitrary kind; thus, our contexts will not assign metatypes to any variables. As far as the latter kind of statement is concerned, we obseve that although we can derive the judgement ':p, we do not require contexts which contain it; hence (:truth context) is su cient.
As we pointed out above, the following semantic domains are ordered by inclusion:
truth prop F 0 set F 0 And indeed there are other inclusions in the domains. This structure is re ected by the containment relation (in fact, a partial order) which is imposed on the types. When , we say that is contained in, or is a subtype of, . means that any expression which is of type is also of type ; moreover, any object in the model which belongs to the domain D associated with also belongs to the domain D associated with . The most salient containments in our system are the following: We now prove some simple lemmas which help us to establish relationships between the di erent categories of types in our system. Lemma 2 The only judgement e is: e e.
Proof By induction on the de nition of .
The cases (e ), (p ) and (Id ) are obvious. 
Type Inference Rules
In the preceding subsection, we gave a de nition of the syntax of expressions occurring in judgements. These de nitions were deliberately general, and could encompass a variety of logical systems. In specifying a particular calculus, such as L , we need to make explicit how the types of expressions of L are inferred. It is to this task that we now turn.
Not all functions can be mapped down into the collection of objects, and following Aczel Aczel 80], we shall call these functionals. That is, adopting Frege's correlation thesis Frege 77], we will see that all we need in the formal theory are objects, functions and functionals and that functions at a higher level than those three can be mapped down to the lower domains. Among the functionals we will count the interpretations of determiners and logical connectives|and indeed, these are expressions which do not admit of nominalization.
The signature of L contains a nite number of statements c: which assign types and metatypes to constants of the language. For now, we are only concerned with logical constants and functionals:
Signature of L ? : p : : (e ! e)
: (e ! (e ! e)) _ : (e ! (e ! e))
: (e ! (e ! e)) = : (e ! (e ! e))
: (e ! (e ! e)) app : (e ! (e ! e)) : ((e ! e) ! e) 8 : ((e ! e) ! e) 9 : ((e ! e) ! e) Two comments on the above are called for. First, it will be noticed that, for example, : is interpreted as a functional which maps any object in F 0 into another such object; we cannot tell, for a given expression , whether : is a proposition unless we have some way of proving that itself is a proposition. This will be made explicit in the axioms for type inference given below. Second, we will use conventional notation for the syntax of the various constants, writing '^ in place of^(')( ), app(x; y) in place of app(x)(y), and 8x:' in place of 8( x:').
A is a proposition whatever object is. For our purposes, it would also be possible to omit the extra condition on the antecedent.
Equality Axioms
We now give a set of equality axioms which are similar to those of the -calculus, except that we allow self-application and polymorphism. Note however that selfapplication is only possible for those expressions which have a complex type; indeed, this is what is required by clause (app) of the syntax above. 3 Models of L
Frege Structures
As pointed out earlier, our models are constructed using the notion of a Frege structure as de ned by Aczel Aczel 80] . We begin with a collection F 0 of objects, and for each natural number n 1, we de ne F n as ff : F 0 n 7 !F 0 g, where F 0 n = n times z }| { F 0 F 0 F 0 . In particular, F 1 is the set of all unary functions from F 0 to F 0 . Within F 0 we pick out prop, the collection of propositions, and truth, the collection of all true propositions. (Thus, Aczel makes a crucial departure from Frege in denying that all true propositions can be identi ed with the True).
So far, then our Frege structures contain objects, functions, propositions and truths. To these, we need to add functionals, logical connectives, and some closure conditions. We now show how they are supplied.
Two functionals are required in order to provide a model for the lambda calculus: 7 : F 1 7 !F 0 app : F 0 F 0 7 !F 0 These obey a comprehension principle such that whenever f is a function in F 1 , then app( x:f(x);a) = f(a):
Let pf be the collection of unary propositional functions in a Frege structure, i.e., those functions f in F 1 which map their arguments into prop: pf = ff 2 F 1 jfor all x inF 0 ; f(x) is in propg 7 We adopt the notational convention of using boldface terms to denote elements of the model, reserving italics for expressions of the object language. For example, app is a functional in the model which corresponds to the functor app in the language.
We can now identify a further subcollection of F 0 , namely set, as the individual correlates of propositional functions under :
De nition 2 (Sets) An object is in set i it is f for some f in pf.
The distinguishing characteristic of sets (i.e. elements of set) is that they can be predicated of any object in F 0 to yield a proposition:
De nition 3 (Predication) If The notions that we have introduced so far|objects, functions, prop, truth, set, comprehension and predication|are based on a model of the -calculus. In order to ensure that they have the properties we want, our models should also contain a logic. We know that such a construction is not straightforward; for instance, logic cannot be built in a simple way on the top of Scott domains (cf. Scott 76] ). The construction provided by Aczel inductively increases the two basic collections of propositions and truths, and the xed point theorem is then applied to provide the limit of these newly obtained collections, resulting in prop and truth. Hence prop is closed under all the logical connectiveŝ : ; x n ) is in prop for all hx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n i 2 F 0 n , then 8f is in prop, and 8f is in truth i f(a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n ) is in truth for all ha 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n i 2 F 0 n . Whenever ' is a w open in x, we understand h'jxi to be the function f in F 1 such that for any a in F 0 , f(a) = ' a=x]. Since we have full abstraction, we can assume that f exists. Now, we take j j: F 0 7 !F 1 to be the functional such that jaj = happ(a; x) j xi:
In general, we de ne j j n :F 0 7 !F n such that j a j n = happ n (a;x) jxi where app 1 = app and app n+1 (a; b;b) = app n (app (a; b) ;b), andx;b are sequences of n variables or elements of F 0 . Now, m n : F m 7 !F n ; m > n is de ned inductively, forã = a 1 ; : : : ; a n as ( n+1 n f)(ã) = hf(ã; x) j xi ( n+m+1 n f)(ã) = n+1 n ( n+m+1 n+1 f) In particular, n 0 nominalizes an n-ary function f returning n 0 f in F 0 .
We take set = f n 0 fjf is any propositional function g:
De nition 5 A Frege Structure is a triple F = hF 0 ; prop; seti constructed as above.
It might be unclear why we have only included F 0 , prop, and set in the structure and ignored functions in general (though not functionals). The reason for this is that the principle of extensionality holds in E 1 and hence we have a bijection between F 0 and F n for n 1. In fact, we can show that (jaj) = a. Up until now, we have not said anything about the interpretation of the predication operator . It will be recalled that, by virtue of ( I ), whenever is an expression of type he; ei, is of type (e ! p). If denotes the nominalization f of a propositional function f, then we want to denote happ( f;x) j xi.
However, the functional corresponding to must carry any object in F 0 into an appropriate value in F 1 . What happens if denotes an object a not in set? In this case, happ(a; x) j xi will not be a propositional function; that is, for any argument b, app(a; b) will just denote an arbitrary object in F 0 . We take this to be an acceptable alternative to the approach used in Partee 84] We shall now show how to construct domains inside F 0 such that the types described earlier can be mapped into them.
Domains
We distinguish between two kinds of domains, Dom 1 and Dom 2 . We use X 1 , Y 1 to range over Dom 1 , X 2 , Y 2 to range over Dom 2 , and X, Y to range over both domains. We also assume that is a distinguished element in F 0 which will be used to give functions a unde ned value. We shall write`f is true' as an alternative for`f is in truth'. Similarly we use`f is false' for`f is in prop{truth'. We also assume the presence of two special elements of the Frege structure, 1 in truth and 0 in prop{truth. Of course, 1 is not the only truth in the model. X)Y = fx 2 F 0 : for all x 0 f X (x 0 ) f Y (app(x; x 0 ))]g Dom 2 , on the other hand, involves domains which are not internally de nable. For example, the two basic domains prop and truth cannot be internally de ned. In fact, according to Tarski's theorem on the unde nability of truth, we cannot have a propositional function in the object language which internally de nes truth; this implies that we cannot have a propositional function which internally de nes propositions; see Aczel 80] for discussion. It might be asked whether the existence of judgements like ?` :t means that we have in e ect committed ourselves to the internal de nability of truth.
The rst point to note is that typing statements are not propositions in L , but judgements about the language. Second, we have no way of telling for an arbitrary expression whether the judgement ?` : t holds. In particular, since contexts ? are nite, they will not necessarily determine the type of an arbitrary variable.
Recall that app is the functional in the Frege structure which corresponds to app in the language of L . We saw that in a standard Frege structure, F 1 = ff : F 0 7 !F 0 g is the collection of all functions from F 0 to F 0 , and contains a subcollection pf of unary propositional functions. We also saw earlier that is a bijective map from F 1 to F 0 . What we now have to check is that, as a special case of De nition 6, there is an appropriate domain F 0 , !prop inside F 0 which will contain the nominals of propositional functions. In fact (F 0 , !prop) = set (easy to prove).
Our next lemma illustrates the fact that the domains constructed above do indeed model the types in our language.
Lemma 8 Note that Dom 1 \ Dom 2 is empty and that Dom 1 will interpret le-types which are not fp-types, among others. Dom 2 will interpret the fp-types, among others.
Since we do not allow variables to range over F-functionals, the interpretation function I is su cient to determine the denotation of functors.
We now de ne a valuation function ] ] which given an expression and an assignment g yields a value in Dom 1 Dom 2 . 
A Fragment of English
The English fragment that we consider is intentionally simple, 9 and will focus attention on issues of polymorphism and self-application. One possible way of setting up the grammar would be to follow Montague in using the standard fractional notation of categorial grammar, together with a homomorphism which maps the categories into semantic types. However, for our purposes, it would be preferable to build the syntactic categories directly on top of the types. Consequently, the categories of the grammar will consist of decorated types and metatypes of L ; that is, types and metatypes annotated with phrase structure labels. The latter will provide us with the power to draw somewhat ner distinctions of the kind required for English syntax. For example, (untensed) intransitive verbs, adjectives and common nouns will all belong to the type he; ei; however, this type will be annotated as he; ei V , he; ei A , or he; ei N , respectively.
The list of admissible labels is the following: S (sentences), V (verbs), N (nouns), CN (common nouns), A (adjectives), P (prepositions), Adv (adverbials).
In some cases, we extend these labels with feature speci cations along the lines of Gazdar et al 85] . For example, we use`P to]' as the label for prepositional phrases whose head is the word to, and`vform' to specify the in ectional status of a verb or verb phrase. Thus V vform bse], V vform fin], V vform psp] indicate verbal categories in, respectively, base form (e.g., be), nite form (e.g., is), and present participial form (e.g., being). We use X as an underspeci ed category label; this will be useful when we want to give a maximally general decoration to a type.
Whenever is a kind, and C is a category label, then C is a decorated kind.
The rules given previously for constructing a complex kind can be generalized in the obvious way to decorated kind. We use the symbols`s, t, r' as metavariables ranging over decorated kinds. It is obvious that we can simply strip the labels o a decorated kind s to recover our original kind. We use` s' to denote the stripped-down version of s, where hs; ti C = h s; ti, and (s ! r) C = ( s ! t).
An English grammar object will be a triple (w; s; ) where w is a phonological (in practice, orthographic) form, s is a decorated kind, is an expression of L , and moreover ?` : s, with as speci ed before.
As a typographical convenience, we shall also employ the following vertical format for these triples: w s For example, the representations of the words John and kiss can be stated as: (19) John e N john 0 kiss he N ; he; ei V i V kiss 0 Thus, kiss has the type of a verbal expression which will combine with something of type e N to make something of type he; ei V . The decorated type therefore combines standard categorial information, which would usually be notated V P=NP (i.e., a functor which combines with an NP to make VP), together with the semantic type that such a category would be mapped into.
The rules of type inference are like those for L with some provisos which we will come to shortly.
It will be noticed that the type assigned to kiss, namely, (20) he N ; he; ei V i V , appears redundant in the sense that not only is the type as whole speci ed to be V , but the result type, he; ei V , is also so speci ed. Yet inasmuch as kiss is the head of verb phrase, it should be predictable that the result type has the same category decoration as the whole complex type. In response to this observation, we adopt the convention that if the result type lacks a decoration, then it can be inferred from the decoration of the enclosing decorated type; in other words, a type like (21) is shorthand for (20) . (21) he N ; he; eii V We can make this more explicit by means of a modi ed inference rule of the following sort (where is restricted to undecorated types): (22) :hs; i C :s app( ; ): C Our grammar for English is non-directional, in the sense that we do not encode whether a functor seeks its argument to the left or to the right. Modifying the notation to allow this would be trivial, but would add an extra degree of complexity which would detract from the main thrust of the exposition. For convenience, we shall simply write the premisses of a type inference rule in the correct left-to-right order, and stipulate that the string in the conclusion is the right of concatenating the strings of the premisses. This is shown in the following schema for type inference in the fragment, (where`_' indicates concatenation):
De nition 9 (Concatenation Schema for English) (Concat) 
Verb-Object Combination
Whether a verb is tensed a ects its ability to combine with a subject, but not its ability to combine with object arguments and complements: The same approach extends to verbs which combine with more than one complement. Before considering such a case, let us introduce some new notation to indicate the iterated application of a functor to a series of arguments:
De nition 10 (Multiple Application) ; x 1 ; : : : ; x n ] = df app(: : : (app( ; x 1 ); : : :); x n ) Assuming give 0 to be of type he P to] ; he N ; he; eiii V , we have the following semantic translation for give the cat to Mary: (25) give 0 , mary 0 , (the cat) 0 ]:he; ei = app(app(give 0 , mary 0 ), (the cat) 0 )
The last step in the derivation of (25) The type change in this rule is closely coupled with the introduction of the predication operator in the semantics. That is, given an expression w which combines with an e(in e ect, any nominalizable expression) to yield an e, we can infer that infl(w) will combine with that same argument to yield a proposition.
And whereas w denoted some object in F 0 , infl(w) denotes a function from F 0 to prop. infl is intended to be a morphological operation which assigns appropriate in ections to the verbal head(s) of its argument. In a more detailed treatment, the operation would need to be parameterized for person, number, and case. Moreover, in addition to denominalizing the interpretation of via , the semantic correlates of, say, past tense would need to be accommodated. To 11 We are ignoring the analysis under which walk is present tense, but not third person.
simplify exposition, however, we shall con ne our attention to one instance of infl, namely third person singular present. This inference rule is illustrated in (28) and (29) Table 1 summarizes the assignment of categories to expressions of English in our fragment. A major distinction is drawn between those expressions which receive ordinary types, and are therefore open to nominalization, and those which receive metatypes, and can never be nominalized. The notion of`predicative', which we appealed to at the beginning of this paper, cuts across this distinction. That is, it was intended to cover expressions with type he; ei, which can be nominalized, and expressions with metatype ( ! ), which cannot.
It will be observed that there is a broad correspondence between our typè he; ei' and the Chierchia and Turner 88] sort`nf ', standing for nominalized functions, and to this extent the two fragments are quite similar.
Note in passing that we have chosen to analyse fun as a mass noun rather than an adjective, on the grounds that collocations involving noun modi ers, as (31a), seem signi cantly better than those involving adjectival modi ers, as (31b Table 1 : Categories and expressions in the fragment (31) a. It wasn't much/a lot of fun. b. ?It was extremely/very fun. Nothing crucial hangs on this decision. Nevertheless, it follows on our account that all mass nouns can occur as nominal arguments. They can also occur as predicative complements by virtue of the polymorphic type assigned to be.
Nominalization and Polymorphism
As we indicated at the beginning of this paper, we do not employ a rule of nominalization as such. Rather, some expressions|the ones categorised as`nominalizable' in Table 1|have This in turn will constitute a premise for the inference (30) which derives the string is fun. The latter can be predicated of any string whose category is a possible argument for the type (e X ! p S ) V , that is, any string for which the category e X can be inferred. Recall the axiom we presented earlier for deriving type containments:
(Contain) ?`
?` : ?` : As we showed in preceding sections, this gives us an account of inclusion polymorphism for the typed language L . In order to deal with polymorphism in the English fragment, we need to extend containment to our decorated types. To do this, we supplement over types with a new partial order over category labels. In the following de nition s, t are decorated types, while C; D The following example shows how the rule is invoked for the subject of (32b). Alternatively, such examples might involve ellipsis of a modi ed verb phrase; cf. Jogging fast would be a pain, but slowly would be fun.
(39) *The/possibly/almost/to is fun.
In Section 1.3, we noted that certain verbs, such as seem, required a predicative rather than a nominal complement. This is witnessed by the following contrast: (40) a. John seems to annoy Mary. b. *John seems the boy.
In Table 1 (41) a. To love is to exalt. b. To give is better than to receive.
By contrast, we have he N ; he N ; eii V vform inf] e X , and can thus accommodate such data straightforwardly.
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